Questions shareholders ask at the AGM 14
Shareholder perks and retail shareholders
Shareholder perks (kabunushi yutai) are a distinctly Japanese way to attract retail shareholders. But a benefit that does not grow with the size of a holding barely reaches large holders or foreign institutions, which raises the question of whether shareholders are treated equally. Proposals have been filed both to abolish perks and to introduce them.
Published 19 October 2026; sources re-checked 24 October 2026. Vote figures come from extraordinary reports and company disclosures.
The questions as asked
Perks give the same benefit however many shares you hold, which is unfair to large shareholders, and institutions sometimes decline them. Perks unrelated to the business do nothing for brand awareness either. Returns to shareholders should come through the share price and dividends.
Summary of the reasons for Yodogawa Steel Works' (5451) 2025 shareholder proposals (Strategic Capital).
Write into the articles a perk voucher that can be used on the company's own products.
Summary of a 2026 proposal at Kitazawa Sangyo (9930) by Tempos Holdings (7.80% of voting rights, by its own account as reported by the press).
What an answer needs to contain
- Purpose, and how the effect is measured: changes in the number of retail shareholders, holding periods or trading, in numbers.
- Cost: the annual cost of the perks, and what it equals as a dividend.
- Fairness: how you view the difference in value for large holders, foreign shareholders and institutions.
- How it fits with dividends and buybacks: its place in total returns.F7
- How it is reviewed: who decides on introducing, changing or abolishing perks, and on what basis.
- In English: if foreign shareholders cannot use the perks, say so and say what they receive instead.
Case: Yodogawa Steel Works (5451), 2025: a proposal to abolish
Yodogawa Steel Works is not covered by the Japan IR Index.
- Proponent
- Strategic Capital (with JAPAN-UP)
- Proposals
- Eight (perks decided by the AGM, abolishing perks, a 6% DOE dividend, abolishing advisory posts, and others)
- Outcome
- All rejected
| 126th AGM, June 2025: shareholder proposals (articles changes need two-thirds) | Support |
|---|---|
| Abolish advisory and counsellor posts (articles) | 28.58% |
| Who decides dividends (articles) | 25.88% |
| Cancelling treasury shares (articles) | 17.92% |
| Let the AGM decide on introducing or abolishing perks (articles) | 17.31% |
| Disclose a business-portfolio plan (articles) | 10.85% |
The proposal to abolish the perks itself (item 8) was not voted on because the articles change it depended on failed. The board said the perks introduce people to the company and prompt them to become shareholders, attract new retail investors and encourage long-term holding, and help stabilise the share price. It opposed the proposals on the grounds that introducing or abolishing perks is a business decision to be made flexibly.
What the answer covered
- Stated the purpose of the perks (awareness, new retail shareholders, long-term holding).
What it left unanswered
- No figures for the effect (changes in retail shareholder numbers or holding periods) and no annual cost.
- No direct answer to the points that perks are "unfair to large shareholders" and "unrelated to the business".
Case: Kitazawa Sangyo (9930), 2026: a proposal to introduce
Kitazawa Sangyo is not covered by the Japan IR Index. We have not reviewed the board's opinion.
Tempos Holdings (7.80% of voting rights, by its own account as reported by the press) proposed an articles change creating a perk voucher usable on the company's own products, and the election of one director. At the AGM on 26 June 2026 the perk proposal received 15.95% and the director 15.98%; both failed. The company's directors were elected with around 87%.
Perks can be the subject of a shareholder proposal either way, to abolish or to introduce. In both cases, what the company needs to show is the purpose, the effect and the cost, in numbers.